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CONTINUATION OF A DECEDENT'S
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS IN PENNSYLVANIA
The owner of a business 1 needs competent legal advice to determine the
best of many alternatives to provide for the disposition of his business at
his death. It is possible that he may not wish to have the business con-
tinue, but in all likelihood he will want to find a way to do so in order that
his family can receive its full value if it is sold or its income if it is retained
for the benefit of the family. One method, of course, is to leave it specifi-
cally to one or more beneficiaries. Another possibility, to avoid the legal
problems arising from the death of the owner of a business, is incorporation.
This not only insures that the death of the owner will not mean the termin-
ation of the business, but it also provides a relatively simple method for
devolution of ownership through bequests of stock. In many cases, how-
ever, incorporation is not feasible and outright bequests do not promise to
accomplish the testator's purpose. For this or other reasons, the owner of
the business may ultimately direct that the business shall pass to his estate
or to a trust to be continued in operation by the executor or a trustee. On
the other hand, the owner may die without ever having made any provision
for disposing of his business. In such cases the business becomes part of
the estate. Much the same result will follow if the testator, probably as
the result of a lack of proper advice, directs only that his business shall be
continued without providing for the many practical and legal obstacles
raised by such a bare general authorization to the personal representative.
Continuation of such a business may be desirable for several purposes.
A sudden liquidation of a going concern cannot be consummated without
substantial losses, especially if the business possesses a valuable good will or
physical assets which ordinarily have little quick sale value. These losses
would be avoided if the business could be continued so as to facilitate its
sale as a going concern or its gradual liquidation. On the other hand, the
beneficiaries of the estate, or some of them, may wish to continue the opera-
tion of the decedent's business indefinitely in order to receive the income
that the continuing business will produce.
Without proper authority in the testator's will, however, the personal
representative faces costly obstacles in serving the interests of the bene-
ficiaries. By running the business without authorization of either will or
court, he assumes the risk of surcharge for every loss incurred in the busi-
ness. Even if the will gives a general power to continue the business, the
trustee or executor may find that his discretion is highly restricted. More-
over, the beneficiaries face the risk of losing the assets of the entire estate
to creditors of the business. Although these obstacles may be avoided in
1. Principal emphasis in this Note has been placed upon a study of the sole pro-
prietorship. However, much of the discussion is relevant to partnerships and other
forms of non-incorporated businesses.
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some states by obtaining the court's authorization to engage in transac-
tions which may be necessary to operate the business to its greatest advan-
tage, the risk of costly litigation which may restrict the powers of the trus-
tee necessitates the drawing of a proper will provision.
The problem faced by the fiduciary under these circumstances is not
peculiar to Pennsylvania, but in order to facilitate a more specific analysis
of the problems which may arise and the methods by which they may be
avoided, the discussion is largely restricted to that state.
RIGHT To CONTINUE THE BUSINESS
Under the general rule in all jurisdictions, a fiduciary has no power
to continue a decedent's business without authorization by will or court.2
Unauthorized continuation of a business by a fiduciary will subject him to
the risk of surcharge for every loss incurred in the operation regardless of
whether or not he was negligent; 3 conversely, any gain must be turned
over to the estate. 4 Moreover, unauthorized continuation may constitute
a breach of a fiduciary relationship in many respects such as the failure to
maintain "legal" investments 5 and the unauthorized use of trust funds.6
As a result, third persons dealing with the fiduciary may be unable to en-
force their contracts against the estate.
7
The Pennsylvania court has found justification for these harsh results
in the fact that the representative may protect himself by selling the prop-
erty rather than suffer any loss; if required to carry on the business or if
its sale is impossible, the person nominated as executor or administrator
may refuse to act as the personal representative.8 There are, however, ex-
ceptions to the rule which would indicate that its real basis is to enable
creditors and beneficiaries to protect their interests from the risk of busi-
ness failure whenever immediate sale is in any way a feasible alternative.
2. Theisen v. Hoey, 29 Del. Ch. 365, 51 A.2d 61 (Ch. 1947); Root's Estate v.
Blackwood, 120 Ind. App. 545, 94 N.E.2d 489 (1950) ; In re Wolf's Estate, 87 N.Y.S.
2d 327 (Surr. Ct. 1943) ; Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A.2d 205 (1951) ; see
In re King's Estate, 19 Cal. 2d 354, 121 P.2d 716 (1942).
In the case of a partnership, the authority must be expressed in the articles of
partnership. Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222, 46 Atl. 257 (1900); Gratz v. Bayard, 11
S. & R. 41 (Pa. 1824); Jurkowitz v. Jurkowitz, 44 Lackawanna County Jurist 266
(Lackawanna County, Pa., C.P. 1943). See also cases cited in Fuller, Partnership
Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise After the Death of a Partner, 50 YALa
L.J. 202, 205 (1940).
3. In re McGovern, 118 N.Y. Supp. 378 (Surr. Ct. 1908) ; Moran's Estate, 261 Pa.
269, 104 Atl. 585 (1918).
4. Harrison v. Harrison, 39 Ala. 489 (1864); in re Byrnes, 114 App. Div. 532,
100 N.Y. Supp. 12 (1st Dep't 1906) ; Allam's Estate, 199 Pa. 573, 49 Atl. 252 (1901).
5. "Legal" investments are those approved by the courts as proper or prescribed
by statutes. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.506, 320.821.2-.9 (Purdon 1950).
Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892) ; in re Cady's Estate, 211 App.
Div. 373, 207 N.Y. Supp. 385 (4th Dep't 1925) ; Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa 36, 156 Atl.
309 (1931).
6. Henchey v. Henchey, 167 Mass. 77, 44 N.E. 1075 (1896).
7. Lucht v. Behrens, 28 Ohio St. 231 (1876); Corr's Estate, 8 Pa. Dist. 209
(Philadelphia County Orphans Ct. 1899) ; McMahan v. Harbert, 35 Tex. 451 (1872);
cf. In re Tisdale, 110 App. Div. 857, 97 N.Y. Supp. 494 (3d Dep't 1906).
8. See Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa. 36, 39, 156 Atl. 309, 310 (1931).
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For example, the rule is not applicable if the interested parties consent to a
continuation of the business, 9 or if the only dissenting parties are creditors
who are paid prior to its operation. 10 If continuation in winding up the
estate is necessary to avoid tremendous loss to the estate, the rule may not
be applied," since in this case the interests of neither beneficiaries nor cred-
itors are prejudiced. Where an executor could not sell real estate and
standing timber without great loss, for example, the court sustained his ac-
tion in milling the timber and continuing the business to dispose of it.12  In
a few instances, the fiduciary's action has been upheld where the sale of the
business was impossible. 13 In Nagle's Estate,14 the fact that the life tenant
refused to assent to the sale of the farm exonerated the trustee from liabil-
ity for continuing to operate the farm.
The impracticability of relying on these exceptions to the rule in place
of a proper testamentary disposition is readily apparent. Although con-
tinuation of the business may be advisable, the exact conditions under
which the court would find the requisite danger of loss in immediate sale
are uncertain.'5 If the personal representative attempts to continue the
business by obtaining the consent of creditors, he may find some reluctant
to do so inasmuch as they will lose their priority over subsequent cred-
itors.'6 Yet to make immediate payment may render the further operation
of the business impossible. In addition to the reticence of the creditors to
take the risk of allowing the business to continue there is the -difficulty of
obtaining the consent of all the beneficiaries.17 Even if this can be sur-
mounted, long range planning necessary to effective operation of the busi-
ness may be impossible since the beneficiaries probably may withdraw their
consent at any time.18 Moreover, the tenuous legal status of the business
presents a tremendous danger of time consuming and costly litigation.
9. Philco Radio & Television Corp. v. Damsky, 250 App. Div. 485, 294 N.Y. Supp.
776 (2d Dep't 1937); Steeby v. Norcutt, 143 Ore. 501, 20 P.2d 1080 (1933); Estate
of John S. Longnecker, 54 Dauphin County Rep. 24 (Dauphin County, Pa., C.P. 1943).
10. Willis v. Sharp, 115 N.Y. 396, 400, 22 N.E. 149, 150 (1889) (dictum).
11. See, e.g., Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150 (1876) (hotel continued in operation
to avoid loss in sale at auction); Greiner's Estate, 14 Pa. Dist. 348 (Philadelphia
County Orphans Ct. 1905) (retail liquor saloon; executor could not obtain buyer at
private sale) ; Orne's Estate, 7 Pa. Dist. 337 (Philadelphia County Orphans Ct. 1898)
(hosiery factory; could not obtain buyer except at great loss).
12. Benscoter Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Luzerne County Orphans Ct. 1948).
13. Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa. 36, 156 Atl. 309 (1931) ; Greiner's Estate, 14 Pa. Dist.
348 (Philadelphia County Orphans Ct. 1905) ; Orne's Estate, 7 Pa. Dist. 337 (Phila-
delphia County Orphans Ct. 1898).
14. 305 Pa. 36, 156 Atl. 309 (1931).
15. Compare Poullian v. Brown, 82 Ga. 412, 9 S.E. 1131 (1889), Succession of
Sparrow, 39 La. Ann. 696, 2 So. 501 (1887), Florsheim Bros. v. Holt, 32 La. Ann. 133
(1880), with Lawton & Willingham v. Fish, 51 Ga. 647 (1873), Succession of Worley,
40 La. Ann. 622, 4 So. 570 (1888), Succession of Myrick, 38 La. Ann. 611 (1886).
16. See, e.g., Hicks v. Purvis, 208 N.C. 657, 182 S.E. 151 (1935) ; In the Matter
of the Estate of A. C. Ennis, 96 Wash. 352, 165 Pac. 119 (1917).
17. See, e.g., Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa. 36, 156 Atl. 309 (1931).
18. This rule would appear to be obvious, but there are no cases directly in point.
Cf. Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 Atl. 443 (1914) (trustee surcharged even though
consent to run the business had been given by the beneficiaries, but the trustee went
beyond their consent in his actions).
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GENERAL AUTHORIZATION BY WILL
A testamentary provision which gives the personal representative or
a trustee a general authorization to continue any business owned by the
testator at his death is only a partial solution to the problem. Although
this may give the fiduciary the power to continue the business indefinitely,'9
the failure to specify the powers which may be exercised in its operation
places an impractical limitation on the fiduciary's exercise of discretion.
The delegation of many business decisions, which in many cases is a neces-
sary procedure, may be impossible. His investments are subject to attack,
and his power to use any other part of the estate in the business is limited.
Moreover, his ability to use the principal of the entire estate in the busi-
ness may result in subjecting all the assets of the estate to the rights of
creditors of the business with a total loss to the beneficiaries.
Delegation of Authority
The Pennsylvania courts have said consistently that "... in determin-
ing what acts may be validly delegated and what may not, a distinction is
made between discretionary acts and ministerial acts, the general rule being
that the former may not be delegated, while the latter may .... 20 Many
problems arise in the application of such a rule. The major dilemma fac-
ing any fidticiary is how to distinguish a ministerial duty from a discretion-
ary act. There is no doubt that a trust company may assign various duties
to its own employees, 2 ' but beyond this any attempt at delegation is fraught
with danger of over stepping the bounds of the rule. It has been held that
the duty to collect and deposit money can be delegated where there is no
reason to suspect the honesty of the person so designated,22 but the courts
have consistently struck down any attempt by a fiduciary to delegate the
power to invest,2 or the power to close a sale without reporting the offer
to the fiduciary and securing his approvalas or the power to determine
what share of income shall be paid to the beneficiary where the controlling
instrument vests that determination in the fiduciary.2
In the conduct of an ordinary business it would seem necessary to give
the fiduciary substantial powers of delegation in the every day operation of
19. Conant v. Blount, 141 Fla. 27, 192 So. 481 (1939); cf. Foxworth v. White, 72
Ala. 224 (1882); In re King's Estate, 19 Cal. 2d 354, 121 P.2d 716 (1942); Willis v.
Sharp, 115 N.Y. 396, 22 N.E. 149 (1889); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A.2d
205 (1951).
20. Herr v. United States Casualty Co., 347 Pa. 148, 150, 31 A.2d 533, 534 (1943);
see also Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304 (1874).
21. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Barnum, 7 Cal. App. 413, 94 Pac. 400 (1908) ; Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill. 31, 105 N.E. 718 (1914) ; 2 Scorw, TRusTs 917-18
(1930).
22. Herr v. United States Casualty Co., 347 Pa. 148, 31 A.2d 533 (1943).
23. Iscovitz's Estate, 319 Pa. 277, 179 Atl. 548 (1935); cf. Kohler's Estate, 348
Pa. 55, 33 A.2d 920 (1943).
24. See Graham v. King, 50 Mo. 22 (1872); Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304 (1874).
25. Matter of Osborn, 252 App. Div. 438, 299 N.Y. Supp. 593 (2d Dep't 1937).
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the business. Reflective of this is the fact that trust companies, given the
responsibility of continuing a decedent's business, wish to and do retain
key employees in order to insure proper functioning of the business. 26 In
most businesses there is a need for specialized knowledge which the fiduci-
ary cannot be expected to have. For example, the day to day purchase of
inventory may require specialized knowledge, but under a literal reading
of the cases, this may be an undelegable investment since it is of a discre-
tionary nature.
27
The sparcity of cases in the context of continuing a decedent's business
as related to the extent of legally permissive delegation makes it difficult to
determine whether or not the courts would allow some functions to be dele-
gated even though not within the category of ministerial acts. The testa-
tor's general authorization to continue the business may imply a power to
delegate some discretionary acts, but such an implication would be so de-
pendent on the facts of each case that the trustee would be forced to act
with undue restraint. A better rule of law might be to test the permissibil-
ity of delegation in accordance with the usual business practice among
ordinary prudent business men managing property to achieve a constant
flow of income and conservation of capital funds.28 Although this might
enable the fiduciary to act more freely, the risk of surcharge arising from
delegations improper under even a more liberal standard than is presently
found may deter him from delegating functions which might be performed
more profitably by others.
Investments of Capital
Under the Fiduciaries Investment Act of 1949,29 the investments by
a fiduciary are limited to investments such as state and federal obligations,30
certain corporate bonds,3 ' mortgages,32 stocks with prescribed dividend and
earnings records 33 and real estate located in Pennsylvania.3 Clearly this
does not include investments necessary to the operation of the ordinary com-
mercial business such as the purchase of inventory. However, the act
specifically states that the directions of the testator, as to the type of invest-
ments allowed, control.3 5 "Non-legal" investments also may be made if
26. See Pfleiderer, Whe the Fiduciary Takes Over, 93 TRusvs & EsTA'r~s 107
(1954).
27. Cf. Stong's Estate, 160 Pa. 13, 28 AtI. 480 (1894); Woddrop v. Weed, 154
Pa. 307, 26 AtI. 375 (1893).
28. See BoGxRT, TRusvs 383 (3d ed. 1952).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 821.1-.22 (Purdon Supp. 1954).
30. Id. § 821.3.
31. Id. § 821.6.
32. Id. § 821.7.
33. Id. § 821.9.
34. Id. § 821.10.
35. Id. § 821.18, Carr Estate, 355 Pa. 438, 50 A.2d 330 (1947).
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these is acquiescence of the beneficiaries 36 or permitted by the terms of a
court order.
3 7
The effect of a bare general authorization to continue the business in
removing limitations on the power to invest is uncertain since no decisions
have been made directly on this point. Perhaps the problem is one of con-
struing the testator's intent and the nature of his business. If it is found
that he intended the business to be continued only for purposes of liquida-
tion, investments in new inventory might not be allowable. On the other
hand, if it was intended that it be continued for purposes of resale as a go-
ing concern, or to produce income for the beneficiaries, there would be little
problem in investing it in inventory. However, if the business is to be
operated only for sale as a going concern, the purchase of capital items such
as buildings or equipment might subject the fiduciary to surcharge. This
principle of construing the power to invest to accord with the findings of the
testator's intent is probably subject to the limitation that investments can
be made only to continue the same business as was operated by the testator.
An attempt to branch out into a new line of business would probably be an
illegal investment. 39
Sources of Capital
The cases which have arisen from continuation of decedents' businesses
frequently have been concerned with the trustee's power to take additional
capital out of the other principal of the estate for investment in the dece-
dent's business. In the ordinary conduct of a business, the entrepreneur is
often faced with a shortage of working capital. To meet expenses, to make
necessary expansions and for many other purposes, new capital may be
necessary. A general authorization in the testator's will to continue the
business enables the fiduciary to invest other principal of the estate in the
36. Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A.2d 71 (1940) ; Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341,
117 Atl. 54 (1922).
37. Riebel's Estate, 321 Pa. 145, 184 Atl. 118 (1936).
38. Cf. In re Tisdale, 110 App. Div. 857, 97 N.Y. Supp. 494 (3d Dep't 1906);
Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 AtI. 443 (1914).
39. Cf. Butler v. Butler, 164 Ill. 171, 45 N.E. 426 (1896); BOGERT, TRUSTS 531
(3d ed. 1952). In addition to the possible ameliorating effect on the strict doctrine of
surcharging a fiduciary for making unauthorized investments that might be derived
from the testator's general direction that his business be continued, there is a liberal
doctrine based on good faith which may protect a fiduciary from surcharge. In Casani's
Estate, 342 Pa. 468, 21 A.2d 59 (1941), the court held that the trustees would not be
surcharged for retaining "non-legal" investments when retention represented ". . . an
honest exercise of judgment based on actual consideration of existing conditions."
Id. at 473, 21 A.2d at 61. The issue in Casani was retention of "non-legal" investments
rather than making new ones, as in the continuation of business problem. Perhaps the
reasoning of Casani will be applied to the trustee who makes an investment in the good
faith belief that it was within his power; but the scope of such an exception, if created,
is uncertain. Reliance on any such dubious liberalization of fiduciary law by the courts
would be ill-advised. The courts may refuse to approve the trustee's action, even when
it was for the protection of the beneficiaries, if he had acted beyond his powers. Cf.
Kimberly's Estate, 227 Pa. 405, 76 Atl. 99 (1910). Any trustee should be hesitant to
accept a trust when he will be required to sustain the validity of so many investments
by litigation. See Handling Businesses in Trust, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 105 (1954).
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business.40 This power is limited to such advances as are necessary for the
continuation of the business. 41 The courts have upheld such advances where
they were made to meet expenses in a business depression, to make re-
pairs 4 3 or to preserve the estate from great loss.4 However, the fiduciary
has been surcharged where he enlarged the facilities.45 Although these de-
cisions are not direct authority for defining the fiduciary's power under a
general authorization in the Will,4 6 they would strongly suggest that the
fiduciary has no power to use other principal of the estate to expand the
business. For similar reasons, a general authorization to continue any
business the testator is engaged in at his death may further limit the fiduci-
ary's power to go into other lines of business. However, in many instances
serving the interests of the beneficiaries may require switching to another
product or service, taking on a new line or enlarging present facilities.47
Another source of capital for investment purposes is the net profit of
the business itself. Ordinarily the trustee does not have the power to re-
invest these amounts,48 in which case they would be distributed to the bene-
ficiaries. In some instances, however, it may be more desirable to reinvest
these funds rather than to obtain the money needed for the business from
other parts of the principal of the estate, if the fiduciary can invade the en-
tire estate for the benefit of the business.49 So long as the same persons
are the ultimate beneficiaries of the business as well as other parts of the
estate, it will likely be more expedient to satisfy the financial needs of a
business out of its own profits rather than through liquidation of other
assets which may be producing income themselves. Therefore, it would be
a wise business move to place such a discretion in the hands of the fiduciary
whenever feasible.
40. Sulzer's Estate, 323 Pa. 1, 185 Atl. 793 (1936). If it is found that the testator
intended that the business be continued only for purposes of liquidation, then such an
investment would not seem proper. It is questionable whether such an investment would
be approved where the business is continued for sale as a going concern.
41. Cf. Sulzer's Estate, supra note 40.
42. Donnelly's Estate, 246 Pa. 308, 92 AtI. 306 (1914).
43. Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 Atl. 443 (1914).
44. Mustin's Estate, 188 Pa. 544, 41 Atl. 618 (1898) ; see Sulzer's Estate, 323 Pa.
1, 185 AtI. 793 (1936).
45. Parry's Estate, 244 Pa. 93, 90 Atl. 443 (1914).
46. The cases arose in situations where the fiduciary was operating the business
by consent of the beneficiaries rather than a general authorization.
47. Trachtman, Legal Aspects, 93 TRusTs & EsTATxs 106 (1954). Opinion seems
split on whether or not a trustee would exercise such powers, but even those trustees
who were doubtful as to whether they would use the power thought it was feasible to
insert it to provide flexibility if needed.
48. Use of income is usually limited to current expenses. See James v. Echols, 183
Ark. 826, 39 S.W.2d 290 (1931); Bridge v. Bridge, 146 Mass. 373, 15 N.E. 899
(1888); Spencer v. Spencer, 219 N.Y. 459, 114 N.E. 849 (1916); 2 Scown, TRusT s
1260 (1930). Income is not permitted to be used for permanent improvements. Jones
v. Harsha, 225 Mich. 416, 196 N.W. 624 (1923); Stevens v. Melcher, 152 N.Y. 551,
46 N.E. 965 (1897) ; see 2 ScoTT, TRusTs 1264 (1930).
49. See Sulzer's Estate, 323 Pa. 1, 185 At. 793 (1936).
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Assets Subject to Liabilities of the Business
If the assets of the entire estate are made available to be used in the
business, either by express provision or by a general authorization, then
the entire estate may be subjected to the risk of business failure.50 This
risk can be avoided by an express provision in the will which limits liability
for all debts incurred in the fiduciary's operation of the business to the
assets actually invested in the business.5' The express limitation prevents
the creditor from relying on the assets of the entire estate, but in the ab-
sence of such a limiting clause, which would not be provided by a mere gen-
eral authorization, whether the estate is or should be liable for these debts
is a difficult point.
Although many states have limited liability for these debts to assets
actually invested in the business or expressly committed to the business by
the testator,52 the law in Pennsylvania would appear to be uncertain. The
state supreme court has only faced the problem three times. In an 1864
case, Laughlin v. Lorenes's Administrator,3 the court clearly held that the
estate is liable for debts incurred in the continuation of the business unless
the testator has placed a limiting provision in the will or the articles of
partnership. When the issue arose again in 1895, the lower court rejected
the Laughlin rule and held that the estate would not be liable unless the
testator manifested an intention to embark substantially his entire estate
in the business.5 4 It thus adopted the rule of a majority of the states on
this issue.5 5 The supreme court affirmed the disposition in a per curiam
opinion which rested on the ground that the executor had effectively re-
nounced the interest of the estate in the business out of which the claim-
ant's debt arose.56 The last time the issue arose, the court again reiterated
50. See, e.g., Ferris v. Van Imgem, 110 Ga. 102, 35 S.E. 347 (1900); cf. Furst
v. Armstrong, 202 Pa. 348, 51 Atl. 996 (1902) ; Waddell's Estate, 196 Pa. 294, 46 Atl.
304 (1900).
51. In the case of a limiting clause in the partnership agreement, creditors are
clearly limited to assets invested in the business. Wild v. Davenport, 48 N.J.L. 137, 7
Atl. 295 (Ct. Err. & App. 1886); Stewart v. Robinson, 115 N.Y. 328, 22 N.E. 160
(1889); see Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise After
the Death of a Partner, 50 YALt L.J. 202, 210-13 (1940). It has been stated that the
same rule applies to a limitation provided by will. Furst v. Armstrong, 202 Pa. 348,
51 Atl. 996 (1902) ; Roessler's Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 776 (Philadelphia County Orphans
Ct 1896) ; Laughlin v. Lorenz's Administrator, 48 Pa. 275, 283 (1864) (dictum); see
2 WILzIAms, ExxcuToRs 1176 (12th ed. 1930); TOLLER, EX.cuTORS 165-66 (7th ed.
1838).
52. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320 (1879); Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, 105 N.E.
723 (1914); Laible v. Ferry, 32 N.J. Eq. 791 (Ct. Err. & App. 1880); Columbus
Watch Co. v. Hodenpyl, 135 N.Y. 430, 32 N.E. 239 (1892). An executor may be re-
imbursed for payments to creditors out of that part of the estate authorized by will to
be employed in the business, and creditors may be paid out of property applicable to
carrying on the trade. 2 WILLIAMs, ExxcuToRs 1174, 1176 (12th ed. 1930).
53. 48 Pa. 275 (1864).
54. As quoted in Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 334, 31 Atl. 1080 (1895).
55. See note 52 supra.
56. Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 31 Atl. 1080 (1895).
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the Laughlin rule. The case was Furst v. Armstrong,67 decided in 1902.
The court was asked by one of the beneficiaries of a large estate to decree
partition. It denied the petition on the ground that the general authoriza-
tion of the testator that the executrix should continue his business was
deemed to give her power to delay distributing all the assets of the estate,
since these were made subject to the needs of the businesses by the testa-
tor's direction to continue them. Note, however, that the case does not
necessarily provide that a creditor might have reached any part of the es-
tate per the Laughlin rule; consistent with the holding could be an inter-
pretation that the assets were available if the executrix needed them in one
of the businesses, but that until she committed them they were not subject
to the creditor's lien or levy.
From these few cases, it is apparent that the law in Pennsylvania is
not firmly settled as to the extent of liability of the entire estate for debts
incurred in the continuation of the business. Perhaps Pennsylvania could
be convinced to accept the majority rule that the estate is liable only to the
extent that the testator has indicated. At least two considerations are ap-
plicable. To hold the entire estate subject to business needs might result
in an unreasonable delay in settling estates.58 The lower court in Wilcox,
in advocating the majority rule, wrote of the difficulty that might arise if
legacies or devises had to be recalled from the recipients to satisfy demands
of the business.59 On the other hand, it is argued that the entire estate
should be held liable since creditors are led to rely on the total assets unless
expressly restricted. It may be not unreasonable to assume that creditors
will know of the power to use all or part of the entire estate for the benefit
of the business and consider that factor as an assurance of payment, much
as creditors of an individually owned business recognize the full personal
liability of the owner for debts of the business. This reliance theory of
extension of credit is a manifestation of the ostensible ownership concept
which is now largely discredited. Normally credit is extended initially on the
basis of the purchaser's business prospects and credit history.60 Although
the creditors may look to the value of specific assets of the estate as a sec-
ondary assurance of payment, it is doubtful if creditors consider the general
assets of the estate which are not invested in the business. 61 These are the
factors that must be stressed if the court is to accept the limited liability
rule for estates.
57. 202 Pa. 348, 51 AtI. 996 (1902).
58. See discussion of Furst v. Armstrong at note 57 supra.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320 (1879); Frey v. Eisenhardt, 116 Mich.
160, 74 N.W. 501 (1898) ; In the Matter of the Estate of A. C. Ennis, 96 Wash. 352,
165 Pac. 119 (1917) ; cf. Altheimer v. Hunter, 56 Ark. 159, 19 S.W. 496 (1892).
60. JAcOBY & SAULNmR, TrRm LEINDING T0 BusINEss 80-81 (1942) ; SCHULTZ &
RINHART, CRIT AND COLLECTION MAXAGEMENT 245-54 (2d ed. 1954) ; Note, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 91, 92 (1955).
61. See SCHULTZ & REiNHART, op. cit. supra note 60, at 63, 70-71, 72-73; Note,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 92 (1955). The reports of Dun & Bradstreet to creditors of
partnerships and individuals contain no information on assets outside the business.
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AUTHORIZATION BY COURT
In many states, the court may give the fiduciary power to operate the
business or to cure defects in a general authorization. 62 While some of
these states enable the court to sanction continuation only for limited pur-
poses,8 the Pennsylvania statute is more liberal. Under it, the order au-
thorizing continuation may provide for: (1) continuation by the personal
representative or trustee alone, or jointly with others, or as a corporation;
(2) the extent of the liability of the estate or trust on any part thereof for
the obligations incurred in the continuation of the business; (3) whether
liabilities incurred in the business are chargeable solely to the part of the
estate or trust set aside for such use or to the whole trust or estate; (4)
the period of time the business may be conducted; (5) other regulations
the court deems advisable. 64
Like the testator's general authorization to continue the business, this
is only a partial solution. Opposition to the petition leading to litigation
will result in a loss of time and increased costs. Delay in obtaining the
court's authorization may present the fiduciary with the risk of surcharge
if he operates the business in the interim. But the major difficulty with
the statute is that ". . . any party in interest may, at any time, petition the
court to revoke or modify the order." 65 The extent to which this subjects
the operation of the business to the whims of beneficiaries and creditors
is not known, but it is likely that this will prevent the trustee from con-
ducting the business to the best of his ability. However, these limitations
are necessary to protect the interests of beneficiaries; hence, such a statute
cannot be wholly satisfactory to work out problems of continuing the busi-
ness or method of correcting defects in the testator's will.66
ILLUSTRATIVE WILL PROVISION
To avoid the legal problems-presented by a mere general authorization
and the inadequacies of the statutory procedure, the most feasible solution
is a properly drawn will provision. Although individual requirements will
vary in each case, perhaps a model provision will give some indication of
the method by which the problem may be solved.
Assume testator has a wife and a son and daughter, both minors. He
is sole proprietor of a business buying and selling foods at wholesale.
He has substantial capital investment in a warehouse, an office building
62. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODn § 572 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.08 (1944);
IOWA CODx ANN. § 635.52 (1950).
63. See, e.g., CONN. GZN. STAT. § 7039 (1949) (completion of unfinished goods
and sale of stock in the regular course of trade) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1523 (1933)
(sale as going concern during period of administration); MAss. GnN. LAWS c. 195,
§7 (1932) (same).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.504, 320.934 (Purdon 1950). There does not
appear to be any significant difference in the effect of (2) and (3), but both are listed
in the statute.
65. Ibid.
66. Trachtman, supra note 47.
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and trucks and employs drivers, salesmen, office and warehouse help. Tes-
tator wishes to leave his entire estate to his family and to have his business
continued after his death for the benefit of his wife and children. Assume
further that testator does not wish to incorporate the business prior to his
death.
In drawing the provision for continuing the business, it might be ad-
visable to leave it in trust. This has four significant advantages. The busi-
ness could be placed in a non-qualifying trust 67 for the life of the wife or
in trust for the life of one or more beneficiaries other than the wife. This
would avoid the imposition of any federal estate tax when it passes out of
the trust to the remainderman. 8 Secondly, the trustee can act as a care-
taker of the business until a member of the family reaches maturity or gains
the experience necessary to run the business. 69 Thirdly, centralized con-
trol is achieved, whereas other methods of disposition may result in spread-
ing control among numerous beneficiaries. A fourth significant considera-
tion is that a trustee is amenable to the court for negligence and other mis-
conduct. The importance of this can be determined by comparison to an
outright gift to beneficiaries which might result in some of them acting to
the detriment of others since they would be immune from the sanction of
fiduciary liability.70
Provision L
I give to my trustee the power to continue any business I nay have at
my death if he deems it advisable.
The authorization to continue the business should not be mandatory.
Economic conditions may become unfavorable or the family situation may
have changed so that continuation would not be warranted. Forcing a
trustee to continue the business might result in total dissipation of assets
and injury to those whom the testator seeks to protect. A further consider-
ation is that the trustee chosen by the testator probably will not accept the
trusteeship if continuation is mandatory. 1 To insure that the person of
the testator's choice will operate the business, the proposed trustee should
be consulted at the time the will is drawn to insure his agreement with the
powers given and to have the advantage of any practical suggestions he
may have.7
2
67. This is a trust which does not qualify for the marital deduction. It differs
from a marital deduction trust in that the wife gets only a life estate without a power
to invade the corpus or a general power to appoint. If the wife had either of the fore-
going, the assets in the trust would not be taxable to the husband's estate, but would
be taxable to her estate. Assets in the non-qualifying trust are taxable to the husband's
estate but might not be so taxable to the wife. INT. RZv. CoDE of 1954, § 2056.
68. Id. §§ 2031, 2056.
69. Tremayne, Estate Planning for the Mat with a Business, 1955 WAsH. U.L.Q.
40, 41.
70. See Hartman's Estate, 331 Pa. 422, 200 Atl. 49 (1938).
71. Pfleiderer, When the Fiduciary Takes Over, 93 TRuSTS & EsTATZs 107 (1954).
72. See Handling Butsiness in Trust, 93 TRuSTS & EsTATrZs 105 (1954).
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Provision II.
Said business to be continued for the life of my wife and on her death
to be continued for the life of the longest liver of my children. My trustee
shall, however, have the power to discontinue the business at any time if
he deems it advisable.
The period for which the business should be continued in trust will
depend on the circumstances which demand continuation of the business.
If the testator wishes to provide for his wife for life and had a minor son
for whom he wishes the business to be held, the provision as to time would
cover the life of the wife and the minority of the son, or more wisely, until
the trustee believes that the son has gained sufficient experience to manage
the business. However, the business might be held in trust for the lives of
both the wife and-son if the testator did not want to entrust the operation
of the business to his son, or if he has more than one child and wishes the
business to be run for their mutual benefit without the possibility of one
child controlling it for himself. Obviously no standard formula for the
duration of the trust can be devised.
Provision III.
In addition to powers granted by law, my trustee shall have the fol-
lowing powers, exercisable at discretion from time to time without court
approval, with respect to both principal and accumulated income, and such
powers shall continue until the business is discontinued.
A. To incorporate the business at any time he thinks advisable, and
once a form of business is chosen, he shall not be bound to continue in
such form.
The power to incorporate provides a method by which the liability of
the estate may be limited to those assets actually invested in the business.
This power should be discretionary due to the varied circumstances which
may confront the trustee, such as an undesirable corporate tax situation or
limitations on incorporation under state law. Furthermore, the power to
incorporate should be within the trustee's discretion at the inception of the
enterprise or at any time during its continuation. No limitation as to the
reason for incorporation should be set out. Two cases aptly illustrate the
need of such provisions. In Scott's Estate,7 3 the testator provided that his
business might be incorporated. The trustees decided to continue as a part-
nership because of excess profits taxes imposed on corporations. At a later
date the trustees sought to incorporate, and the court held that they had
exhausted the power to incorporate because of the original course they had
taken. In Kimberly's Estate,74 the testator authorized the incorporation of
one or more companies to carry on any business and to transfer to such
corporation any property in the hands of the trustees. The court would
73. 280 Pa. 9, 124 Atl. 270 (1924).
74. 227 Pa. 405, 76 AtI. 99 (1910).
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not allow the trustees to form a holding company for the testator's securities
even though the plan was "commendable" since the court believed the testa-
tor had meant only real property was to be conveyed to the corporation to
be formed. Statutory provisions may cure these inadequacies, but its use
is restricted to situations where there is no condition in the will and is sub-
ject to the general difficulties noted before.75
B. To accept in kind, retain and invest in any form of property with-
out being limited to legal investments and without regard to any principle
of diversification as to such property.
This provision removes any doubts as to the power to invest in "non-
legals," so that the trustee is freed from the risk of surcharge by mistaken
reliance on implications based on special factual situations.
C. To invest any part of the principal of the residuary trust in the
business for any purpose incident thereto, including but not limited to ex-
pansion, repairs, and entry into new fields of enterprise; if he finds it in-
advisable to so use the principal, he may reinvest the business income.
This provision enables the trustee to invest the principal of the estate
freely. Only when it is inadvisable to sell other income producing property
for investment purposes may they divert the profits of the business from
the hands of the beneficiaries to investment in the business. This power
may be limited. In Pennsylvania, the power to invest income at one time
was limited by the Estate Act of 1947,76 which made accumulations void
beyond the minority of the beneficiary.
D. (1) To appoint managers,
(2) To employ or discharge employees,
(3) To sell at public or private sale on credit or for cash,
(4) To borrow money and to mortgage or pledge any real or personal
property,
(5) To compromise claims,
(6) To join in any merger, reorganization, voting trust plan, or other
section of security holders.
These provisions are not meant to be exclusive. However, an enumer-
ation of specific powers which may not fall within the general authority to
operate the business enables the trustee to act without court approval or
risk of surcharge in matters which are constantly coming before him. Tied
to the provision for delegation, they insure an efficient operation of the
business.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.505, 320.935 (Purdon 1950) ; see text at p. 688
supra. However, consent of all interested parties is not required. See Commissioner's
comment, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.505 (Purdon 1950).
76. Id. § 301.3. This section has been repealed. See PA. LAWS 1955, No. 347, at
1030.
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E. To delegate duties with respect to all the foregoing powers; pro-
vided that the trustee in fact approve of and direct the exercise of all the
powers herein provided except those provided in III B, D (2), (3), (5),
and all other powers necessary for the everyday operation of the business.
This provision forces the trustee to supervise the operation of the busi-
ness, determine when it may be inadvisable to continue the business further,
whether to incorporate or make major structural changes in the form of
the business, whether it is advisable to expand or enter new lines of busi-
ness, whether to invest principal or income or to borrow money, and to
appoint the managers of the business. This protects the beneficiaries of
the estate by insuring that major business decisions will be made by the
trustee. On the other hand, it enables the trustee to delegate duties and
powers so that the business can be effectively operated by the management
in areas too trivial to demand the trustee's attention or in business func-
tions requiring specialized knowledge or ability which can be performed by
others more efficiently.
Provision IV.
These powers are to continue in any successor trustee named in the
will.
Considering the wide powers granted, a court might believe that the
appointed trustee was the only person contemplated by the testator to hold




Only the assets actually invested in the business shall be liable for
debts incurred in its operation.
This provision enables the business to be run without subjecting the
assets of the entire estate to liability for debts incurred while the fiduciary
operates the business2 8 In provision III C, however, the power to use the
entire principal of the estate in the business was given. From this a court
might find an intention to embark the entire estate in the business, thus
subjecting the entire estate to the claims of creditors notwithstanding the
limiting clause. Such a result would not seem to be justified. Although
creditors might be misled by the fact that the trustee has the power to in-
vest the principal of the entire estate, the express limitation should insure
that creditors will not rely on any assets except those actually invested in
the business so that this provision should control. However, to insure that
the court will find that creditors were put on notice, it may be advisable to
place the assets of the business in a separate trust with the power in the
77. Trachtman, supra note 47; see, e.g., Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S.W.
1151 (1904); Shoemaker's Appeal, 91 Pa. 134 (1879); see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 320.947 (Purdon 1950).
78. See pp. 686-87 supra.
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trustee to use the corpus of the residuary trust in the business. The corpus
might be made available by loans to the business or by actual investment.
The latter seems open to serious objections. Some form of limited part-
nership or corporation would have to be formed to admit the residuary
trust. Otherwise, the trust would be acting as owner so that the vicious
circle of limiting liability and advancing principal would appear again. The
loan provision in the residuary trust would appear more feasible. The resid-
uary trust would become a creditor, and the court would have difficulty in
finding that both constitute a single trust.
CONCLUSION
It is recognized that each case will require a will provision tailored to
meet its individual requirements, but it is submitted that a carefully drawn
provision of broad scope is essential in every situation. Failure of the
draftsman to draw such provisions can result only in a disastrous waste of
time and money for his client's estate because of the limitations imposed
by law on the powers of the fiduciary. Even with the broadest powers,
there should be little fear of excesses on the part of the trustee. As has
been stated by the Pennsylvania court, ". . . the measure of care and dili-
gence required of a trustee is such as would be pursued by a man of ordin-
ary prudence and skill in the management of his own estate." 79 Consistent
with this high standard of conduct, power can be vested safely in the trus-
tee to provide the greatest flexibility which is needed to attain the highest
return possible for the trust.
79. Stong's Estate, 160 Pa. 13, 28 AtI. 480 (1894).
1956]
